Robbery is a serious, widespread and sometimes violent crime resulting each year in costs to victims of several billion dollars. Data on the incidence of robbery reveals certain striking racial disparities. African Americans are more likely to be victims, arrestees and prisoners than are members of other demographic groups, and while black-on-white robberies are very common, white-on-black robberies are extremely rare. The disparities for robbery are also much greater than those for other crimes of acquisition. We develop a model of robbery that attempts to address these and other stylized facts. The key insight underlying the model is that robberies are typically interactions between strangers which involve a sequence of rapid decisions with severely limited information. Potential o¤enders must assess the likelihood of victim resistance, and victims must assess the likelihood that resistance will be met with violence. Racial disparities in the distribution of income can cause such probability assessments to be race-contingent, a¤ecting crime rates as well as rates of resistance and violence. We argue that this model helps account for several empirical regularities that appear puzzling from the perspective of alternative theories of crime.
crime seems to be concentrated within groups. 5 What accounts for such systematic racial disparities? Answering this question is the chief goal of this paper. We argue that the key to understanding racial disparities in the prevalence of robberies is to recognize that they involve dynamic interactions among strangers under conditions of incomplete information. Victims of attempted robberies may choose to comply or resist, and o¤enders may respond to resistance by ‡eeing or attempting to force compliance through violence. Because members of di¤erent groups are drawn from di¤erent distributions of unobserved characteristics, they will be treated di¤erently and will therefore face di¤erent incentives. 6 Hence two individuals who share the same non-racial characteristics will exhibit systematic di¤erences in equilibrium behavior. Speci…cally, the likelihood of victim resistance can depend on the perceived race of the offender, and hence make robbery itself more lucrative for members of groups who face less resistance.
This interdependence of victim and o¤ender conjectures makes robbery di¤erent from other crimes of acquisition (such as burglary and theft) and explains why blacks are more disproportionately involved with robbery than with these other crimes. 7 Intimidation is no advantage for a burglar or thief, but it is for a robber. To the extent that whites …nd blacks intimidating, black criminals face incentives to eschew burglary and theft and concentrate on robbery.
More concretely, suppose that robbery victims believe that black o¤enders are more likely than white ones to use violence in the face of victim resistance. In this case, they will be less likely to resist black o¤enders relative to white ones. Other things equal, this results in crime being more lucrative for blacks relative to whites. Suppose further that potential o¤enders believe that black victims are more likely than white ones to resist an attempted robbery. Then o¤enders of all types will prefer white victims to black ones. The actual probabilities of violence (conditional on resistance) and resistance (conditional on being confronted) will be determined in equilibrium, and equilibrium beliefs must accurately re ‡ect these objective probabilities. How might the beliefs described above arise in equilibrium without any innate group di¤ erences in the propensity for violence? This can happen if the probabilities of victim resistance and o¤ender violence are correlated with such 5 While 72% of the victims of black robbers were white, only 16% of the victims of black murderers were white, 26% of the victims of black rapists, and 53% of the victims of black assailants (Fox and Zawitz, 2004; NCVS 2002,   table 42 ). 6 By "unobserved"we mean characteristics that other participants in a robbery do not observe, not characteristics that econometricians do not usually observe. For example, the personal income of a robbery victim is typically unobservable to a potential o¤ender. 7 Regarding incarceration, for instance, the disproportion for blacks relative to non-Hispanic whites was 6.6 for burglary and 8.6 for theft, as compared with 16.1 for robbery. characteristics as personal income or wealth, which are unobservable to the participants in a robbery, but which exhibit systematic and well-known di¤erences across groups. For instance, if poorer o¤enders are more likely to use violence in an attempt to force compliance, and if poorer victims are more likely to resist robbery attempts, then racial income disparities can cause both victims and o¤enders to condition their actions on the perceived race of those with whom they are interacting.
We show how this can account for the racial disparities in crime rates, as well as the enormous gap between black-on-white relative to white-on-black robberies.
Our theory also has empirical implications for rates of resistance and violence. We show that a uniform deterrence policy that makes robberies of all types less lucrative for o¤enders has the e¤ect of lowering crime rates but of increasing the likelihood of violence conditional on resistance.
The reason is that such policies lead to the disproportionate exit from the robber population of those potential o¤enders who are least prone to violence. Those who continue to rob are therefore more likely to be violent in the face of resistance. These predictions accord with the empirical record-while robberies overall declined by more than a half over the period 1993-2002, robberies involving injury declined at a much lower rate, and hence the proportion of robberies involving violence rose steadily. 8 The model also implies systematic racial di¤erences in rates of resistance and violence. For instance, we predict that o¤enders of all types will be less likely to resort to violence when facing resistance from white (rather than black) victims. This latter prediction is surprising, and follows from the fact that those potential robbers who confront only white victims are less prone to violence than those who confront victims of all types. The model also predicts that victims of all types will o¤er less resistance to black (relative to white) o¤enders. A …rst look at the data over the ten year period 1993-2002 provides some support for both of these predictions. On the other hand, we …nd that in the case of black-on-white robberies, the extent of resistance is higher, and the likelihood of violence lower than one would predict on the basis of the model. These …ndings are tentative, however, and a systematic empirical exploration is well beyond the scope of the present paper.
We begin in Section 2 with the legal de…nition of robbery and a further discussion of the empirical regularities that motivate this work. Section 3 contains a model of robbery which attempts to capture the essential features-sequential choice under incomplete information-described above.
Section 4 uses the model to examine the e¤ects of two kinds of law enforcement policies, deterrence and incapacitation, on robbery rates and on the incidence of resistance and violence. Section 5 8 Section 4 contains further details on recent changes in robbery rates, violence and resistance.
extends the model to the case in which beliefs are conditioned on racial categorization, and shows how the racial disparities evident in the data can arise in equilibrium. Section 6 considers alternative hypotheses that have been advanced to account for racial disparities in the incidence of criminal behavior, and argues that they inadequate in explaining both the extent and the nature of the disparity. Section 7 concludes.
De…nitions and Evidence
In the United States, robbery is de…ned as "taking, or attempting to take, anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear" (Sourcebook, 2002, p. 570) . Examples are muggings, hold-ups, and confrontations where one teenager scares another into giving up his coat. Unsuccessful attempts count as robberies.
Robbery is distinguished from other crimes of property acquisition by the use or threat of force. Burglary, for instance, involves entering a structure to take something without confronting a person, and theft involves activities like shoplifting where no personal confrontation occurs.
Personal confrontation is a necessary element of robbery. Stealing a car with nobody in it is motor vehicle theft; stealing a car with someone in it (a carjacking) is robbery. Robbery di¤ers from assault, another crime of personal confrontation, because its purpose is acquisition. Barroom brawls and domestic violence are assaults because o¤enders are not trying to acquire money or property from their victims. 9 African-Americans are considerably more likely to be arrested and imprisoned for robbery relative to other groups. This does not necessarily imply that African-Americans commit robberies at a higher rate than members of other racial or ethnic groups since it cannot be reasonably assumed that the criminal justice system is free of bias. The consensus among criminologists who have studied the question for many years, however, is that African-Americans do commit robberies at considerably higher rates than whites or Hispanics. The relative disparities in o¤ending probably approach the relative disparities in arrests or incarceration. A review article by Sampson and Lauritsen (1997) summarizes the consensus: 9 A small number of robberies turn into murders when victims die. The classi…cation of "murder" trumps the classi…cation of "robbery." For our purposes, these crimes should be considered robberies, but government agencies do not keep data in this fashion. The number of felony-murders, however, is small-less than half a percent of the number of robberies-and so we will ignore these crimes.
While limitations exist for both o¢ cial and self-report data, it thus appears that race di¤erences in o¤ending as recorded in arrest reports and victimization surveys re ‡ect real di¤erences in the frequency and seriousness of delinquent acts.
Some of the most useful data on this question come from the National Criminal Victimiza- The most striking feature of this table is the large di¤erence between the number of black-onwhite robberies and the number of white-on-black robberies. 10 The latter are virtually non-existent. survey over 30% of all such robberies involved a white victim and an all-black group of o¤enders, while none involved a black victim and an all-white group of o¤enders. 11 Our model addresses and accounts for this …nding, as well as the disproportionate prevalence of blacks among the population of o¤enders.
1 0 Standard errors are 0.054 (white-on-white), 0.052 (black-on-white), 0.017 (white-on-black) and 0.045 (black-on-3 A Model of Attempted Robbery
Preliminaries
The key elements of a robbery are personal confrontation (typically between strangers), the threat or use of force, and the attempt to obtain property. Such interactions involve a sequence of rapid decisions made by victims and o¤enders, and these decisions must be made under severe informational constraints. Under such conditions racial classi…cation can in ‡uence the actions of both parties. Our model is an attempt to capture these e¤ects.
When a potential robber is faced with an opportunity, he must decide whether or not to make the robbery attempt. If an attempt is made, the victim can either comply with the robber's demand or resist it. If faced with resistance, the robber can abandon the attempt and ‡ee, or can try to force compliance through violence. When contemplating a robbery attempt, the perpetrator typically cannot know whether the victim will resist. Similarly, when contemplating resistance, the victim cannot know whether the robber will ‡ee or attempt to force compliance. Resistance by the victim followed by an attempt at forced compliance is potentially very costly to both parties -both face the risk of serious injury, and the robber faces both an increased likelihood of arrest as well as more severe punishment conditional on arrest. The most desirable outcome from the robber's perspective is compliance by the victim. The most desirable outcome from the perspective of the potential victim is a decision by the potential robber not to make the robbery attempt in the …rst place. Conditional on a robbery attempt the victim's best response is to resist if she believes that the robber will ‡ee, and to comply if she believes that the robber will use force. Conditional on victim resistance, the robber's best response may be to ‡ee, or it may be to use violence in order to force compliance. And the payo¤s to both robber and victim are somewhat lower in the case of a failed robbery attempt (when resistance is met with ‡ight) than if no attempt had been made in the …rst place.
These payo¤ considerations can be expressed in the form of a simple two-player game with three stages, as shown in Figure 1 . At the …rst stage, the potential robber (player 1) decides whether or not to attempt to rob the potential victim (player 2 to the robber and y 2 to the victim. If the robber attempts to force compliance through violence, the payo¤s are z 1 to the robber and z 2 to the victim. such that a player's type 2 completely de…nes her preferences over all outcomes in the game.
One interpretation of a player's type is her outside option or initial wealth level, although other interpretations are possible.
We intend to describe the characteristics of the robber and the victim that are unobservable during the attempted robbery. Given the potential robber's observable characteristics the distribution of robber types is commonly known and is described by the continuous distribution function We allow for the possibility that F and G are identical, although in general (if robber and victim have di¤erent observable characteristics) these two functions will di¤er. 12 1 2 In section 5 we explicitly introduce race as an observable characteristic and explore the implications of this for
The payo¤s x i ( ); y i ( ); and z i ( ) are all fully determined by the player's type and are assumed to be di¤erentiable functions of . We assume that robbers of all types gain from a robbery attempt that is successful without violence, but lose from an unsuccessful attempt. This is relative to the zero-payo¤ baseline in which no robbery attempt is made. Furthermore, we assume that victims of all types rank the four possible outcomes in the same order: from the victim's point of view, violent robberies are worse than successful non-violent ones, which in turn are worse than unsuccessful robbery attempts. Hence a victim who is certain that resistance will be met with ‡ight will resist, and one who is certain that resistance will be met with violence will comply. Best of all is the outcome in which no attempt at robbery is made in the …rst place. These considerations imply the following:
In addition, we assume that victims of higher type lose less when successfully robbed, but lose more when subjected to violence. This is motivated by the interpretation of as an outside option or initial wealth level. The rationale is that the wealth transfer that takes place during a successful robbery is a smaller share of initial wealth for higher types, while the willingness-to-pay to avoid injury is greater for wealthier individuals. Formally:
Next, we assume that robbers with higher incur higher costs from a violent outcome as well as from an unsuccessful robbery attempt, and the former costs rise faster than the latter. Wealthier robbers have more to lose from the harsher penalties or injuries that can result from a violent outcome, and these costs rise with wealth faster than the relatively minor costs associated with an unsuccessful robbery attempt. The payo¤s of victims vary with type in exactly the same way:
wealthier victims incur greater costs from violent outcomes as well as from failed robbery attempts, and the former costs rise with wealth more rapidly than the latter costs. This implies the following:
Assumption 3. For all 2 ; and for j = 1; 2; z 0 j ( ) > y 0 j ( ).
Finally, we assume that robbers with very low wealth levels prefer to respond violently when faced with resistance, while those with higher wealth levels prefer to ‡ee. Furthermore, individuals with equilibrium behavior. More generally, such attributes as age, weight, gender, manner of dress and speaking, presence of eyeglasses or facial scars, or visible possession of a weapon could all be observable attributes which a¤ect beliefs.
su¢ ciently low wealth prefer to attempt robbery even if they are certain of resistance. The rationale is that poorer robbers have more to gain from the completion of the robbery, and hence the higher probability of capture (and the more severe penalties conditional on capture) that violence entails are less of a disincentive. Hence we have:
Assumptions 1-4 together imply that for any given beliefs of the victim regarding the probability with which resistance will be met with violence, lower wealth victims will be more likely to resist relative to higher wealth victims. They also imply that for any given robber beliefs about the probability of victim resistance, lower wealth individuals will be more likely to attempt robbery.
We have motivated our discussion of types by interpreting as wealth or income-an unobservable variable that reduces a robber's willingness to use violence and increases a victim's expected losses from a violent encounter. Wealth, of course, is not the only variable that has this property.
For instance, unobserved psychological and moral propensities, real or imagined, clearly play a role in how people react in stressful situations. It is probably most appropriate to think of as a latent variable that is a function of both wealth and a set of psychological variables. 13 The game tree depicted in Figure 1 , together with the common priors F ( ) and G( ), over player types and the functions x i ( ) ; y i ( ) and z i ( ) together de…ne an extensive-form Bayesian game : We next characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game.
Equilibrium
Consider a victim who has been confronted by a robber and believes that resistance will be met with violence with probability : In this case the victim will comply if her type is such that
and resist if the inequality is reversed. Since x 2 is strictly decreasing and both y 2 and z 2 are increasing, there will exist some threshold type~ ( ) such that victims will comply if their wealth exceeds~ ( ) and resist if it lies below it. The probability that a robber will meet resistance is then simply G(~ ): The threshold~ is itself strictly decreasing in ; the greater the expectation of violence, the smaller the set of victims who resist. Now suppose that potential robbers believe that a proportion of victims will resist if confronted. In this case an individual of type will attempt robbery if
and refrain from doing so if the inequality is reversed. Since z 1 ( min ) < 0 and x 1 > 0 for all ; individuals who are of su¢ ciently low type will attempt robbery. Furthermore, since min fy 1 ( ) ; z 1 ( )g is increasing and x 1 ( ) is decreasing, there exists some type^ > min such that all types beloŵ attempt robbery and all types above^ do not. The threshold^ is strictly decreasing in .
Of the types who attempt robbery, a subset will use violence if they meet with resistance. Let 2 ( min ; max ) denote the unique solution to the equation y 1 ( ) = z 1 ( ) : 14 Then the proportion of robbers who are prepared to use violence is given by F ( )=F (^ ) if^ and 1 otherwise.
In equilibrium, the beliefs of both robbers and victims must be consistent with the strategies adopted by the players, namely the mappings from types to actions. Hence equilibrium beliefs
and
Given our assumptions, the following holds (see the appendix for proofs of all formal results):
Proposition 1. has a unique equilibrium ( ; ) ; and 2 (0; 1):
Since 2 (0; 1) in equilibrium, we can rewrite (3) as simply
and combine this with (4) to get the following equilibrium condition:
In equilibrium, some types attempt robbery while others do not. The set of types who attempt robbery include some who ‡ee when met with resistance, and also some who resort to violence.
Hence there are three types of crime that can arise with positive probability: (i) nonviolent robberies, (ii) violent robberies, and (iii) failed attempted robberies. The rates at which these occur 1 4 Uniqueness and interiority of follows from assumptions 3 and 4 above.
depend on the type distribution in the population and the manner in which types are related to payo¤s through the functions x i ; y i ; and z i : Given the payo¤ and distribution functions, rates of crime, violence and resistance are uniquely determined.
Crime Rates
Given the equilibrium values ( ; ) ; determined jointly by the conditions (4) and (5), the overall crime rate (aggregating the three types of crimes) is given by = F (^ ( )): The proportion of robbery attempts that are successful without violence is simply 1 . The proportion of robbery attempts that fail are (1 ) ; and the proportion that end in violence are :
Many of the equilibrium parameters can be recovered directly from empirical data-assuming that the distribution from which robbers are drawn is the same in all encounters, as is the distribution from which victims are drawn. 15 For instance, the NCVS shows the following as the outcomes of all single-o¤ender robberies in 2002: This method has another weakness, in addition to the assumption of the irrelevance of observed characteristics. Some robberies do not conform to the game-theoretic model we have been discussing. Sometimes robbers will simply strike their victims …rst and forcibly remove valuables, instead of making demands and letting victims decide whether to comply. These crimes will appear in the upper left-hand corner, "completed, with violence," along with crimes where the robbery follows our model. If we were able to purge strike-…rst robberies from the data, our estimates of and would both decrease.
Deterrence and Incapacitation
Many discussions of criminal justice policy revolve around the relative e¤ectiveness of deterrence and incapacitation, broadly de…ned. Deterrence policies attempt to make crime less attractive to all types of potential criminals by increasing the expected punishment that follows commission of a crime. Incapacitation policies attempt to alter the distribution of types in the population without changing the propensity of any given type to commit crime. Broadly construed, incapacitation policies thus include not only imprisonment but also education, rehabilitation, the encouragement of religion and morality, and possibly access to abortion.
In our model, incapacitation policies alter the distribution of robber types, while deterrence policies change the robbers' payo¤ functions. Since our model includes three di¤erent kinds of robberies (failed, successful without violence, and successful with violence), there are at least three di¤erent kinds of deterrence policy. In particular, we are interested in the manner in which changes in the functions x 1 ; y 1 and z 1 a¤ect the equilibrium values of and : Three types of changes are possible: (i) harsher penalties from violence, which we interpret as an upward shift in the z 1 ( ) function, (ii) smaller expected rewards for successful robberies, which we interpret as a downward shift in x 1 ( ) ; and (iii) harsher penalties for failed attempts at robbery, or a rise in y 1 ( ) :
Proposition 2. Harsher penalties for violence result in a declines in and ; and a rise in :
Smaller rewards for successful robberies, or harsher penalties for failed robbery attempts, result in a rise in ; and declines in and :
As might be expected, all deterrence policies result in a lowering of the crime rate . The e¤ects on the prevalence of resistance and violence depend, however, on the details of the policy. Harsher penalties for violence reduce the equilibrium likelihood that resistance will be met with violence, and result therefore in greater resistance. While the overall proportion of robberies ending in violence is indeterminate (since resistance is higher) the proportion that are successful without violence falls, as does the overall crime rate.
Smaller rewards for successful robberies could arise either from a higher likelihood of subsequent apprehension, harsher penalties conditional on apprehension, or a decline in the amount of cash and other valuables held by potential victims. While this deterrence policy also results in a lower crime rate, the probability of violence contingent on resistance rises, and the extent of resistance accordingly declines. The reason for this is that the decline in crime rate results from the exit of robbers with higher ; who are also less prone to violence; the robbers who remain are lower types who are more likely to be violent. Lower resistance implies that a greater proportion of attempted robberies are successful, and a greater proportion of resisted robberies end in violence.
Higher penalties for failed robbery attempts have exactly the same e¤ect.
In practice, any given policy that changes penalties or rewards will simultaneously a¤ect all three functions x 1 ; y 1 ; and z 1 : Proposition 2 can be used collectively to determine the direction of these e¤ects, although in some cases unambiguous predictions may not be possible. One case in which unambiguous predictions can be made is that in which expected penalties for all kinds of robbery increase by the same amount. We say that a uniform deterrence policy is imposed if, for all , x 1 ( ) decreases by some amount k > 0, and y 1 ( ) and z 1 ( ) increase by k. Qualitatively, uniform deterrence increases look like increases in penalties for failed robberies:
Proposition 3. A uniform deterrence policy results in a rise in , and declines in and :
These results yield empirical predictions. A uniform deterrence increase or an increase in the penalties for failed robberies should raise the proportion of robberies that are successful and nonviolent (1 ), and cut the proportion of failed robberies (1 Since the overall incidence of robbery fell dramatically during the 1990s, these results let us
begin to assess what sort of impact deterrence policies may have had. Table 3 shows the changes in each of the four classes of single-o¤ender robbery between 1993 and 2002, a period over which the aggregate decline was 55%: Several patterns are evident in the table. Robberies involving injuries declined less than robberies overall, so the share of violent robberies in total robberies increased over this period. The sharpest declines occurred in failed robbery attempts (without injury), suggesting that conditional on resistance, the incidence of violence rose. Successful robberies without injury declined somewhat less than robberies overall, suggesting that rates of resistance fell slightly over the period. Direct computation of rates of resistance and violence con…rms that there was a steady increase in ; with a modest (but insigni…cant) decline in over this period (Table 4) . 16 This trend is not compatible with an exclusive reliance on harsher penalties for violent crimes, but it is consistent with the other kinds of deterrence measures, including a uniform deterrence policy. In general we cannot tell how and will react to a change in the distribution of criminal types without specifying more precisely how the distribution of types changes. However, a policy that disproportionately incapacitates potential robbers with low will lower and raise : To see this, suppose we start at some distribution F and move to a new distribution H that stochastically dominates F . In other words, H ( ) =F ( ) 1. If the movement from F to H disproportionately incapacitates the potential robbers with the smallest , then H ( ) =F ( ) will be an increasing function. We say that incapacitation is directed at the violent if H ( ) =F ( ) 1 and is increasing for all . For future reference, when H( ) and F ( ) are such that H that stochastically dominates F and H( )=F ( ) is increasing, we shall say that F ( ) is strongly tougher than H( ):
Then we have 
Explaining Racial Disparities
The model so far has assumed, in e¤ect, that all robbers and victims have the same observable characteristics. In order to address and account for the kind of racial disparities identi…ed in the introduction, this assumption needs to be relaxed. We do so as follows. Suppose that each individual belongs to one of two identi…able groups, blacks and whites, and that the groups di¤er with respect to their type distributions. Let F b ( ) and F w ( ) denote the distribution functions for robbers in the two groups respectively. Let G b ( ) and G w ( ) denote the distribution functions for victims in the two groups respectively. Suppose that all other functions x i ; y i and z i are identical across groups, which implies also that the threshold and the functions^ ( ) and~ ( ) are the same.
We know from Proposition 1 that for any given interaction (once the race of both victim and o¤ender have been observed), equilibrium behavior is uniquely determined. 18 Behavior in equilibrium will generally be race-contingent. For instance, a victim's decision to resist may depend on the race of the perpetrator, since this may provide information about the probability with which resistance is met with violence. This latter probability may itself depend on the race of the victim, if a robber's decision to confront a victim is sensitive to the victim's race.
To allow for all these e¤ects, let ij denote the victim's estimate of the probability with which resistance will be met with violence when the perpetrator belongs to group i and the victim to group j: Similarly, let ij denote the robber's perception of the probability with which the victim will resist when the perpetrator belongs to group i and the victim to group j: The following equilibrium conditions now need to be satis…ed for each o¤ender type i 2 fb; wg and each victim type j 2 fb; wg:
These can be consolidated as follows:
Let ij F i ^ ij denote the crime rate when the perpetrator belongs to group i and the victim to group j:
The following result establishes that if the white income distribution stochastically dominates the black income distribution among the population of potential robbers, then blacks will have higher crime rates than whites against each victim group. Furthermore, if the black income distribution is strongly tougher than the white distribution, then white o¤enders will be resisted more frequently in equilibrium, and are less likely to resort to violence conditional on resistance, regardless of whether the victim is black or white. 19 Proposition 7. Suppose that for all 2 ; F b ( ) > F w ( ) : Then for each j 2 fb; wg ; bj > wj :
If, in addition, F b ( ) is strongly tougher than F w ( ) ; then bj > wj and bj < wj for each j 2 fb; wg :
Hence black crime rates will be uniformly higher than white crime rates against both black and white victims if whites are more a-uent than blacks as a group. Note that this e¤ect occurs despite the fact that successfully robbing whites is no more lucrative than successfully robbing blacks: we have assumed that robber payo¤s are independent of victim types. The reason for the higher crime 1 9 Empirically, the black income distribution is indeed strongly tougher than the white.
rates is more subtle and can be understood intuitively as follows. Suppose crime rates were uniform across race. Then blacks would face lower resistance from victims of all groups since, relative to whites, a greater proportion of those attempting robbery would be willing to use violence. This follows directly from the hypothesis that the white income distribution stochastically dominates the black income distribution. Lower resistance makes crime more lucrative, resulting in higher black crime rates. Note that in equilibrium, it need not be the case that blacks in fact face lower resistance or that a greater proportion of black o¤enders are prepared to use violence. Since the set of types who choose robbery in the black population is larger than the set of types who choose robbery in the white population, it is entirely possible that a greater proportion of black robbers are in fact non-violent in equilibrium.
Next consider how rates of crime, resistance and violence vary with the race of the victim, holding …xed that of the robber:
Then for each i 2 fb; wg ; ib < iw ;
ib > iw and ib > iw :
Hence all robbers in both groups exhibit a preference for white over black victims. The probability of violence conditional on resistance is greater for black victims relative to white. This is because the pool of o¤enders willing to confront white victims is larger and hence contains a greater share of non-violent types. Despite the fact that white victims are less likely to face violence conditional on resistance, the model predicts that they resist at lower rates than black victims. Hence the e¤ect on resistance rates of the fact that whites are richer as a group outweighs the e¤ect of the fact that they face a less violent population of robbers in equilibrium.
These theoretical results have certain clear empirical implications for rates of crime, resistance and violence. While a systematic empirical analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, we can provide a tentative assessment of some of these implications using NCVS data.
Disparities in Crime Rates
Taken together, Propositions 7-8 imply that if the white income distribution stochastically dominates the black income distribution in both robber and victim populations, then wb < ww < bw and wb < bb < bw : These conditions can be combined as follows: The rankings of crime rates are fully in accordance with (10) , and the black-on-white crime rate is an order of magnitude higher than the white-on-black crime rate. 20 
Disparities in Resistance and Violence
Propositions 7-8 also make sharp predictions about rates of violence and resistance. Holding constant the race of the o¤ender, a white victim faces a lower probability that resistance will be met with violence. Despite this, white victims resist with lower frequency. And holding constant the race of the victim, black o¤enders are more likely to resort to violence conditional on resistance, and are less likely to face resistance in the …rst place. How well do these predictions accord with the evidence? NCVS data for single-o¤ender robberies can be used to address this question. Since white-on-black robberies are so rare, we examine the validity of our predictions for the remaining three categories of crime.
2 0 Since any assumptions about matching imply that the number of times a black meets a white is the same as the number of times a white meets a black, the relationship between bw and wb remains the same no matter how blacks and whites are matched. Table 5 contains the disaggregated data, which shows that despite considerable variation over time in rates of violence, the predicted inequality is satis…ed for eight of the ten years in the sample. For three of these years (denoted by an asterisk) the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level.
Moreover, for the two years in which the inequality is not satis…ed the di¤erence is insigni…cant.
Turning to the likelihood of resistance, the model implies that white victims will resist with greater likelihood when faced with a white (rather than black) o¤ender: ww > bw : Aggregate and bw = 0:553 (standard error 0.023), which is consistent with this prediction. This di¤erence is statistically signi…cant. The disaggregated data is shown in Table 6 : the inequality holds in seven of the ten years in the sample, although none of the individual year di¤erences is signi…cant. To summarize, the model accounts for the racial disparity in robberies, and in particular the enormous gap between black-on-white and white-on-black robbery rates. It also makes a number of predictions about racial di¤erences in rates of resistance and violence which can be tested against the empirical record. A preliminary look at the data suggests that some (but not all) of the predicted patterns appear to arise. Until a systematic empirical investigation is undertaken, however, these empirical claims must be considered highly tentative.
We turn next to a discussion of alternative theories which have been advanced to account for racial disparities in crime, and argue that they do not adequately capture the stylized facts that motivate our analysis.
Alternative Explanations
Quite a few theories have been advanced to explain the racial disparity in robbery rates. There are also "common-sense" folk explanations. In this section we will review some of the more popular of these theories, and show why they are inadequate. Sampson and Lauritsen (1997) provide a more detailed critique of many of these theories. While the various arguments presented here can account to some degree for the racial disparities in overall crime perpetration, none are able to address the striking fact that black-on-white robbery rates are vastly greater than white-on-black robbery rates. Furthermore, these are theories of crime in general rather than robbery in particular.
Hence they cannot account for the rise in the proportion of robberies with injury as overall robbery rates have fallen, and cannot address racial disparities in the likelihood of resistance and violence.
Characteristics
The most popular way to explain racial disparities in crime is to point to some particular characteristic, assert that this characteristic causes a disproportionate propensity to engage in crime, and
show that African-Americans are more likely than whites to have this characteristic. Examples of characteristics that might be used in this way are: having grown up without a father present, being poor, being poorly educated, having lower scores on measures of "intelligence", and owning a gun.
In this view, characteristics are the link between race and crime: conditional on having one or more of them, blacks should be no more or less likely to commit crime than whites or Hispanics. 21 These explanations fail because it is impossible to explain the racial disparity in robbery unless you can explain why blacks are more likely to commit robbery conditional on these characteristics.
Robbery arrests are far more concentrated on African-Americans than are any of these characteris- Notice that equal concentration is only a necessary condition for characteristic stories such as these to work. Even if blacks were eight times as likely as whites to be poor, for instance, poverty di¤erentials would explain the robbery arrest disparity only if the non-poor were never arrested for robbery. Thus Lochner and Moretti (2004) …nd that equalizing black and white educational attainment would eliminate only 23% of the racial incarceration gap (which is smaller than the racial robbery arrest gap). 22 Considering the interaction among several characteristics moves us no closer to an explanation.
In general, a story about interaction between two characteristics can explain more than the stronger of two simple characteristics stories only in two special circumstances: either crime depends on the intersection and the characteristics are much more strongly correlated among blacks than among 2 1 Note that in our model, blacks and whites with identical non-racial characteristics (as represented by ) will behave di¤erently in equilibrium, since their racial characteristics alone are su¢ cient to in ‡uence beliefs and hence the actions of those with whom they interact. 2 2 This is their OLS result. They do not report similar calculations for the more sophisticated regressions that they run, but those regressions lead them to conclude that OLS produces a reasonably accurate measurement of the impact of education on crime.
whites; or crime depends on the union and the characteristics are much more strongly correlated among whites than among blacks. Analogous conditions hold for 3-way, and n-way interaction. We have found no evidence that either of these special circumstances holds for any set of characteristics.
Under-deterrence and Social Osmosis
Economic theories of crime emphasize how the probability and severity of punishment deter potential wrong-doers. Under-deterrence, therefore, is a potential explanation for black crime-perhaps African-Americans commit more crimes because they are less afraid of the consequences. This is the operative mechanism is Sah's (1994) "social osmosis"theory of crime, for instance-neighborhoods with many criminals in them overwhelm the police; this lowers the probability of apprehension, and so perpetuates and exacerbates disparities. This hypothesis also appears in Anderson (1999) . His argument is that lawlessness prevails in black neighborhoods because the police have abandoned them and do not treat black-on-black crime su¢ ciently seriously.
The greatest problem that an under-deterrence theory of racial disparities encounters is that there is no evidence that African-American criminals face lower probabilities of apprehension or less severe punishments. If such were the case, African-Americans would be more heavily represented among o¤enders identi…ed by victims than among arrestees or prisoners. That is not the pattern we see.
Racial disparities in judicial processing have been studied extensively, and the consensus is that blacks are not treated more leniently than whites. Ayres and Waldfogel (2003) …nd that AfricanAmericans are forced to pay discriminatorily high bail. The U. S. O¢ ce of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (1999, p. 3) concluded from a review of many studies that "there is substantial evidence that minority youth are treated di¤erently from majority youth within the juvenile justice system"-being more likely to be placed in public secure facilities, for instance, rather than private facilities or diversion, even considering the severity of the crime and other factors. Sampson and Lauritsen (1997) review the literature on adult case disposition and sentencing. They conclude (p. 355):
When restricted to index crimes, dozens of individual-level studies have shown that a direct in ‡uence of race on pretrial release, plea bargaining, conviction, sentence length, and death penalty among adults is small to nonexistent once legally relevant variables (e.g., prior record) are controlled.
Nor is it plausible to argue that blacks commit more crimes against blacks because their victims are less likely to call the police. Black robbery victims are slightly more likely to report the crime, but the di¤erence was not statistically signi…cant (NCVS 2002, table 94 ). If police did not treat black victimization as seriously as white, we would expect to see more white-on-black robbery than black-on-white, when in fact the opposite is the case.
The second problem with an under-deterrence theory of racial disparities is that elasticities of crime with respect to deterrence measures are so small that disparities in apprehension and punishment would have to be very great to explain any substantial portion of the disparity. Most econometric estimates (for instance, Witte 1980) put the elasticity of o¤enses with respect to the probability of arrest or imprisonment in the range of 0.3 to 0.5. Almost certainly it is less than unity. But only if the elasticity of o¤enses is greater than unity can weaker deterrence explain more per capita arrests. With this elasticity less than unity, a group with a lower threat of arrests would have fewer arrests, not more.
Econometric estimates of the elasticity of o¤enses with respect to length of sentences generally …nd that it is lower than the elasticity with respect to arrest probability ("certainty matters more than severity") and often …nd that it is very small. Suppose that this elasticity is 0.3-a very high estimate. Then African-Americans would commit twice as many o¤enses as whites only if their punishment was roughly a tenth of white expected punishment. And African-Americans would commit eight times as many robberies only if whites were punished a thousand times more severely. Considering the volume of research on racial sentence disparities, it is inconceivable that a discrepancy of this magnitude could have been overlooked.
Thus traditional deterrence theory is of little use in explaining racial disparities, and any more imaginative reconstruction (de…ning the severity of punishment di¤erently, for instance) has very large obstacles to overcome.
Culture of Violence
Another explanation is that African-American sub-culture is to blame. According to this view, The sub-culture explanation also fails to explain why African-Americans are more heavily overrepresented in certain crimes than in others. Drug tra¢ cking, gambling, prostitution, receiving stolen property, and motor vehicle theft are all less violent (and more pro…table …nancially) than rape and assault, but African-Americans are more heavily over-represented in the former crimes than in the latter. 
Physical Size

Adverse Selection
Loury (2002) develops a model of adverse selection to explain why cab drivers fear black men.
Out of fear, cab drivers make black men wait longer, and so robbers end up disproportionately represented among the black men who endure and get a cab. This is because robbers gain more from a cab ride than regular passengers do, and so are willing to wait longer. This is an equilibrium in which cab drivers's stereotype of black men as robbers is con…rmed.
While this model accounts for discriminatory treatment, it predicts that within the population of passengers white men rob cabs more often than black men do. Robbing cabs is easier for white men than for black, because they do not have to wait as long, and proportionately more of them do it (although robbers are a smaller fraction of riders). Thus a generalization of Loury's model does not predict that blacks will be disproportionately involved in robbery.
Social Interaction
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (GSS) (1996) most-murder and robbery-and least powerful for those they commit relatively least-burglary and assault. Instead, GSS conclude that social interaction is of almost negligible power for murder, and only modest power for robbery. Social interaction is of greatest importance for motor vehicle theft, a crime of moderate African-American disproportion, and theft, a crime of little disproportion.
Conclusions
The idea that racial stereotypes can have incentive e¤ects that result in systematic di¤erences across groups in behavior dates back to the seminal work of Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972) .
Early applications of this idea focused on labor markets, and addressed racial disparities in wages, job assignment, and human capital acquisition. In order for the theory of statistical discrimination to be operative, however, it is necessary that the characteristics in question be both unobservable and responsive to economic incentives. As noted by (Akerlof, 1976 , p.608), there are "di¢ culties in applying this model to real-world racial discrimination"in labor markets since characteristics such as education and experience are generally observable at little cost, while traits such as punctuality and initiative, being acquired in early childhood, are relatively unresponsive to wage di¤erentials.
This suggests that the theory of statistical discrimination may be most relevant to sporadic, anonymous interactions in which payo¤-relevant characteristics are necessarily unobservable, and where potential gains and losses can be signi…cant. The crime of robbery satis…es all of these criteria.
Our theory of racial disparities in the incidence of robbery, resistance, and violence is based on the idea that group inequality can a¤ect incentives in ways that induce otherwise identical individuals to behave di¤erently in equilibrium. 23 Victims entertain the belief that black o¤enders, being drawn from a population with lower levels of income, are more likely than whites to respond violently to resistance. This lowers their incentives to resist and makes crime more lucrative for non-violent black o¤enders who bene…t from (but do not …t) the stereotype. The result is disproportionate involvement of blacks in robbery. For similar reasons, potential robbers believe that black victims are more likely than whites to resist attempts at robbery. This makes them less attractive targets, and explains the huge gap between black-on-white relative to white-on-black crime. An implication of the disparity in crime rates is that black victims face a group of o¤enders that is on the whole more violent; this prediction of the model is roughly consistent with the empirical record.
One limitation of our work is that potential victims make only one decision-whether or not to resist a robbery attempt. In practice, potential victims can employ a variety of strategies (Ehrlich, 1981 and Cook, 1986) . In particular, they can employ costly precautions to avoid being victims of crime at all. Such avoidance behavior explains in part why the old, the rich, and women are less likely to be robbery victims. Allowing victims to take costly precautions is an obvious extension to our model. If moving to areas with few robbers is cheaper for whites than for blacks, then ceteris paribus the resistance rates for whites who do not move should be higher. This could explain one of our empirical anomalies. More importantly, racial asymmetry in robbery can then lead to racial segregation and discrimination in housing markets.
Finally, we have assumed throughout that beliefs held by both victims and perpetrators are self-ful…lling in equilibrium. This is the hallmark of the economic approach: behavior is optimal given the beliefs that individuals hold, and beliefs are accurate, given the behavior that they induce. Psychologists have long recognized, however, that "stereotypes based on relatively enduring characteristics of the person (such as race, religion and gender) have enormous potential for error" 2 3 The idea group inequality can result in di¤erential outcomes for otherwise identical blacks and whites appears also in Sethi and Somanathan (2004) , where it is shown that in stable sorting equilibria blacks experience lower neighborhood quality than whites of comparable income.
(Hilton and von Hippel, 1996, p. 241). There are a number of channels through which inaccurate stereotypes can arise and persist. Once activated, stereotypes can in ‡uence attentiveness to new information, the interpretation of ambiguous information, the behavior of the holder towards the target of the stereotype, and the standards against which the behavior of the target is judged (Hamilton et al., 1994) . To the extent that the holder is more receptive to stereotype-con…rming information, and tends to interpret ambiguous information in a manner that is stereotype-consistent, beliefs about group characteristics can persist even if they are inaccurate. Such considerations strengthen rather than undermine the conclusions drawn in this paper. The existence of an inaccurate but persistent stereotype of black male violence, for instance, would result in qualitatively similar but quantitatively greater racial disparities in crime rates relative to the predictions of our analysis. We consider the explicit introduction of such psychological perspectives into models of economic behavior to be a promising direction for future research.
Proof of Proposition 1. First we show that < 1 in any equilibrium. Suppose, instead, that = 1: Then = G(~ (1)) = 0 from (4) and hence, from (3) and the fact that F (^ (0)) = 1; we have = min
contradicting the supposition that = 1: Hence < 1; and we can rewrite (3) as simply
Combining this with (4) we get the following single condition for equilibrium:
where
Note that ' is increasing in ; since~ ( ) and^ ( ) are both decreasing and F ( ) and G ( ) are both increasing. Furthermore, '(0) = 0 and '(1) = 1: The latter follows from the fact that G ~ (1) = 0 (facing certain violence, all victims comply) and F (^ (0)) = 1 (facing certain compliance, all robbers confront). Hence there is a unique value of 2 (0; 1) that satis…es the equilibrium condition (11) . This implies a unique equilibrium value of from (4).
Proof of Proposition 2. An upward shift in z 1 ( ) implies a decline in and hence in F :
The function~ ( ) is una¤ected by the change in z 1 , since it is de…ned implicitly by
and the functions x 2 ; y 2 ; and z 2 are all unchanged. The function^ ( ) is also una¤ected, since it is de…ned implicitly by
Since~ and^ are both decreasing and F and G are increasing and positive, (6) implies that a decline in F must result in a lower : From this, (4) , and the fact that~ is a decreasing function, we know that must rise. The overall crime rate = F (^ ( )) therefore falls, since the decreasing function^ has not shifted while has risen.
A downward shift in x 1 ( ) has no e¤ect on the~ ( ) function, but the^ ( ) function shifts down (for any given beliefs about resistance fewer robberies are attempted). This follows from the fact that^ ( ) is implicitly de…ned by (1 ) x 1 (^ ) = y 1 ^ , there is no change in y 1 ( ) ; and x 1 ( ) is decreasing and has shifted down. This implies from (6) that is higher in equilibrium, since F is una¤ected by the downward shift in x 1 ( ) ;^ ( ) has shifted down, and the left-hand-side of (6) is increasing in : Higher implies lower from (4), the fact that~ ( ) is decreasing, and has not been shifted. The overall crime rate = F (^ ( )) must be lower (otherwise could not have risen, given that F ( ) is the same).
An upward shift in y 1 ^ results in a decline in^ ( ) : This follows from the fact that^ ( ) is implicitly de…ned by (1 ) x 1 (^ ) = y 1 ^ , there is no change in x 1 ( ) ; and y 1 ( ) is increasing and has shifted up. There is no e¤ect on either~ ( ) or F . Taken together, this implies from (6) that is higher in equilibrium, and hence from (4) that is lower (since~ ( ) has not shifted).
The overall crime rate = F (^ ( )) must be lower (otherwise could not have risen, given that F ( ) is the same).
Proof of Proposition 3.
A uniform deterrence increase leaves the function~ ( ) unchanged, since it depends only on victim payo¤ functions. A uniform deterrence increase also leaves the value unchanged, since it is implicitly de…ned by the equation y 1 ( ) = z 1 ( ), both sides of which increase by the same amount k. Hence F ( ) is unchanged. The function^ ( ), however, is changed. In particular it shifts down for all : the threshold value at which potential robbers are willing to attempt robbery falls. Since^ ( ) falls and the other functions de…ning '( ) remain the same, '( ) falls for all . (Here ' ( ) = F ^ G(~ ( )) as in the proof of Proposition 1.) Since '( ) is increasing, it follows from (6) that increases. Since increases, = G( ( )) falls. Since = F ( )= ; by de…nition, falls.
Proof of Proposition 4. With all payo¤ functions unchanged, there is no shift in the threshold or in the functions^ ( ) and~ ( ) : The share of violent types in the population as a whole, F must fall. Suppose, by way of contradiction, the the crime rate = F (^ ( )) does not fall.
Then from (5), must be lower, and hence from (4), must be higher. But since^ ( ) is a decreasing function and F ( ) has shifted down, this implies a lower crime rate = F (^ ( )); a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the condition (6) with the new distribution H but the old equilibrium . We claim that
since^ > from Proposition 1, and H ( ) =F ( ) is increasing in . But from (6),
This establishes the claim (12) . The new equilibrium value of is de…ned by H(^ (G(~ ( ))) = H( ): Since H(^ (G(~ ( ))) is an increasing function of , (12) implies that the new equilibrium value of must be smaller than . Since the function~ ( ) is unchanged and decreasing, (4) implies that the new equilibrium value of is higher.
Proof of Proposition 6. The …rst step is to show that both changes reduce G(~ ( )) for all . For the rightward shift in the distribution of victim types, this result is obvious, since the function~ ( ) does not change. Greater expected cost of violence shifts the~ ( ) down, and so reduces G(~ ( )).
Since^ ( ) is a decreasing function, '( ) = F (^ (G(~ ( )))) rises for all . Hence '( ) > F ( ).
Since '( ) is an increasing function, must fall. From (5) and F ( ) unchanged, F (^ ( )) must rise. Since^ is a decreasing function and F is increasing, must fall.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose F b ( ) > F w ( ) for all 2 : Then, in particular, F b > F w : Now suppose (by way of contradiction) that bj wj for some j 2 fb:wg : Recall that ij = F i ^ ij by de…nition, so from (7), we obtain bj > wj : Since~ ( ) is decreasing and G j ( ) is increasing, this implies bj < wj from (8) . But since^ ( ) is decreasing, F w is increasing, and F b ( ) > F w ( ) for all 2 ; we obtain:
which contradicts the hypothesis that bj wj : Hence bj > wj for all j 2 fb:wg : Now suppose that F b ( ) is strongly tougher than F w ( ) ; so F w ( ) =F b ( ) is nondecreasing.
Consider any j 2 fb; wg : We claim that
since^ > from Proposition 1, and F w =F b is increasing in . But from (7) (8) ,
which proves that (13) holds. Note that from (7-8), we have
is an increasing function of , (13) implies that wj < bj . Since the functioñ ( ) is unchanged and decreasing, and G j is increasing, (8) then implies that wj > bj .
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose G b ( ) > G w ( ) for all 2 and suppose (by way of contradiction) that iw ib for some i 2 fb:wg : Then, by de…nition of ij , we have F i ^ ( iw ) F i ^ ( ib ) : From (7), therefore, ib iw : Using this, together with (8) and the facts that~ ( ) is decreasing, G w ( ) is increasing, and G b ( ) > G w ( ) for all 2 ; we get
and hence iw < ib : Using this, the fact that^ ( ) is decreasing and F i is increasing for each i 2 fb; wg ; we get
contradicting the hypothesis that iw ib : Hence ib < iw for all i 2 fb:wg : To obtain the results for and ; recall that for any i; j 2 fb; wg ; F i (^ (G j (~ ( )))) is increasing in : Since^ ( ) is decreasing, and G b ( ) > G w ( ) for all ; we therefore have
where the last equality follows from the equilibrium conditions (7) (8) . The same conditions imply
and so we have.
